































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The idea that property crime and other forms of diversion are inherent by–products of the unequal
accumulation of wealth has a long tradition in economics. For example, Adam Smith (1776 [1937])
argues that the accumulation of property by some, would generate opportunities for others to gain
from criminal activities:
‘‘Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five
hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites
theindignationofthepoor,whoareoftenbothdrivenbywant, andpromptedbyenvy, toinvadehispossessions.’’
Adam Smith (1776 [1937], p. 670)
In the absence of adequately enforced property rights, we might therefore expect property crime to
rise whensomeindividuals accumulatewealth. Sinceincreasedinsecurity over property islikely to
act as a disincentive to investment (see Besley 1995), it follows that the process of economic devel-
opment could sow the seeds of its own demise. The recent experience of Russia and other transition
economies illustrates the potential consequences of the absence of adequate law enforcement on
laissez faire economic development.1
Underlying Smith’s analysis is the presumption that while some individuals can generate suffi-
cient incomes via legal activities, others are instead faced with a choice between less productive
legal activities and crime.2 While this could be the result of chance or differences in ability, capital
market imperfections may also play an important role. Indeed, capital market imperfections are es-
pecially likely when the protection of private property is costly and ineffective. For example, if the
privatecostsofprotectionagainstcrimearehigh,thewealthyaremorelikelythanthepoortoprotect
their property. Understanding this, lenders are likely to be more willing to lend to the wealthy than
the poor, and at relatively low interest rates. If some potential entrepreneurs are credit–constrained,
then the accumulation of wealth could also act to reduce the crime rate. Increased wealth will tend
to open up new legal opportunities as individuals gain increased access to capital. If, as a result,
fewer agents undertake criminal activities, then the security of investments will rise. This should
induce further investment, so that still fewer individuals become criminals.
How then should we expect property crime to evolve with the level of development? Will it rise
as the opportunities to gain from crime expand, or fall, as access to productive legal opportunities
1 On the expansion of crime in Russia, see Goldman (1996).
2 Empirical work by Freeman (1994) confirms that criminal activities do indeed tend to be concentrated amongst less wealthy members of society.
1increase? Social historians report that the rapid industrialization of nineteenth century Western
Europe was initially accompanied by a rise in property crime rates and then later by a decline.3
What could account for such a ‘‘hump–shaped’’ pattern? Is it possible that the development process
could generate so much crime that growth falls to zero before the economy advances very far?
Relatedly, does greater security over private property result in greater economic development by
improving investment incentives and access to credit markets, or is it the other way around?
The answers to these questions are of more than pure academic interest. Cross–country income
disparities are too wide to be explained by differences in human capital or technology levels alone
(Olson, 1996).4 Differences in institutional arrangements and government policies that discourage
crime, corruption and other forms of diversion offer a potential explanation for these disparities.
For example, Svensson (1993) finds that the lack of secure property rights has a detrimental impact
on growth. Relatedly, Hall and Jones (1997) find a significant positive correlation between output
per worker and the extent to which governments adopt ‘‘anti–diversionary policies’’.
In this paper, we explore these issues in the context of a two–period overlapping generations
model. When young, agents earn heterogeneous wages that depend on their human capital and em-
ployment opportunities. When old, agents choose either to become capitalist entrepreneurs, crim-
inals or to subsist. Entrepreneurs invest in a project, borrowing capital, if necessary, at the market
rate of interest, and hiring labor at the market wage rate. Criminals do not produce, but instead
randomly invade entrepreneurs and steal their output. Agents who are unable to become capitalists
and for whom the returns to diversion are small, subsist on relatively low incomes.
Borrowers can adopt costly private security measures which reduce the probability that their
property is stolen. However, lenders cannot observe whether or not this investment is made, and
so they must design debt contracts that ensure incentive compatibility. Only wealthy borrowers,
who have a large stake in their project, will find it profitable to incur the cost of security. Because
less wealthy agents cannot commit ex ante to doing so, the interest rate they face includes a risk–
premium exceeding that faced by richer borrowers. Since the return on other legal activities is low,
these agents are therefore much more likely to pursue a life of crime than wealthier ones.
We characterize the evolution of an economy starting from a low wealth state, holding constant
3 We discuss this data in more detail in Section 2.
4 Moreover these factors cannot account for the lack of capital flow towards poorer regions which would, according to the neoclassical model,
hasten the convergence between productivity levels (see Barro et al. 1995).
2the public institutions of property rights enforcement. Initially, few agents have sufficient wealth to
qualifyforaprofitableloan. Theremainderareleftwiththechoiceofalowincomefromsubsistence
oralifeofcrime. However,theopportunitiestogainfromcrimeareconstrainedbythesmallnumber
of potential victims. Since there is a surplus of potential criminals, the probability of invasion is
driven to its maximum level and so also is the interest rate. In such an ‘‘opportunity–constrained
equilibrium’’, there is little demand for the labor supplied by the young generation, and the wages
they receive are correspondingly low. However, so long as the average wage exceeds that received
by the previous generation, the fraction of agents qualifying for low–interest rate loans grows. As
the rate of enterprise expands, so also do the opportunities to gain from criminal activities, so that
there is a matching increase in the crime rate.
Theeconomyevolvesin this fashion, withboththerateofenterpriseand thecrimerategradually
expanding, until the inactive subsistence population is exhausted. As before, for a given degree of
insecurity, past wage increases continue to expand the number of agents who are eligible for low–
interest loans. Now, however, the increased opportunities to undertake productive legal activities
draw agents out of the pool of criminals, so that the equilibrium crime rate and the degree of inse-
curity declines. This generates a secondary effect by reducing the risk premium charged by lenders
and raising the fraction of agents who are eligible for low interest loans even further. This in turn
drives up the demand for labor and causes the wage to rise. The increased wage generates a further
increase in the rate of enterprise in the next generation and a further reduction in the crime rate. The
economy continues to develop in this fashion as long as this ‘‘criminal–constrained equilibrium’’
continues to exist.
The economy converges to a long run steady–state. In general, it does not converge to a zero
crime rate, but may instead converge to a long run stationary positive crime rate. The nature of
the steady–state equilibrium depends crucially on the underlying institutional parameters. If the
effectiveness of private security is low and/or the cost is high, the economy may never experience
the second phase of development and high crime rates and low productivity will persist in the long
run. Otherwise, theeconomyeventuallyexperiencesfallingcrimeandhigherlong–runproductivity.
We also assess the implications of endogenous credit constraints for the effectiveness of public
expenditures on alternative crime–deterring institutions. According to Becker (1968) harsher pun-
ishments or a greater likelihood of successful prosecution, reduce the payoff to crime and induce
3more people to undertake productive activities. In our analysis, the fact that individuals are credit–
constrained implies that increasing the expected punishment may have little impact on crime.5 If
it requires significant tax increases,6 then increasing the expected cost of punishment may even
be detrimental, actually raising the crime rate and lowering productivity. In contrast, public ex-
penditures which reduce the likelihood that criminals will be successful ex ante, can have larger
effects, even for relatively small tax increases. Such expenditures may include the expansion of
local police patrols, spending in support of gun control laws or community–based initiatives such
as ‘‘neighborhood–watch’’. By reducing the insecurity associated with property crime, public in-
vestments such as these help to reduce the interest rate faced by borrowers and the cost of private
security measures. This, in turn, induces greater productive activity and reduces the crime rate.
Our paperis related to theliterature initiated by Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
(1993). In these papers, individuals choose between productive and diversionary activities (‘‘rent–
seeking’’)bycomparingtheirrelativerewards. Sincetheserewardsaredeterminedbytheallocation
of individuals between activities, multiple equilibria can arise. The key feature of these equilibria
is that high levels of appropriation are associated with low levels of development. Our model may
also generate multiple equilibria with this feature, but the mechanism is somewhat different. There
can be equilibria with many criminals and a large risk premium, so that credit is inaccessible and
output is low. Alternatively, there can be equilibria with no criminals and no risk premium, so that
all agents have equal access to productive opportunities and output is high.7
The key contribution of our paper, however, is its characterization of the dynamic interaction
between crime rates, credit market imperfections and the accumulation of wealth. In the static
models discussed above there are no credit constraints, so that differences in occupational choices
and investment decisions depend directly on relative ability.8 In our framework ability matters,
indirectly via the wages earned when young, because of the borrowing constraints that agents face
when old. This has three key implications which we emphasize in this paper:
5 Empirical evidence on the impact of punishment on crime rates is mixed (see Ehrlich, 1996). Marceau and Mongrain (1998) survey several
alternative theories regarding the impact of punishment on crime.
6 For example, greater costs might be incurred from expanding the court system or from extending prison terms, etc.
7 Multiple crime equilibria can also arise in Sah (1991) and Fender (1997) because for a given level of resources allocated to apprehension and
punishment, the probability of arrest declines with the crime rate. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) discuss multiple equilibria in models
of crime.
8 Acemoglu (1995)develops a dynamic version of the Murphy–Shleifer–Vishny story. He shows that their static equilibria areall potential steady–
state equilibria. However, there is no accumulation of wealth and the results are driven by forward–looking behavior. See also Baland and Francois
(1997).
4² History matters — higher investment by one generation, generates an increased demand for labor
from the next, which bids up their wages and relaxes their borrowing requirements;
² Opportunity–constrained equilibria can arise — as a result it is possible for the crime rate to rise
with output in the early stages of development, before falling again in later stages;
² Policies aimed at ex ante crime prevention are likely to be more cost–effective than those focused
on ex post punishment.
Our work is also related a number of other themes in the literature. Grossman and Kim (1995)
develop a static model in which they analyze the relationship between the security of claims to
property rights and the level of welfare. In particular, they emphasize the role of activities which
are purely defensive, as well as those that are offensive.9 Although our model also features the
endogenous adoption of costly ‘‘defensive’’ security measures, the main role played by them is in
generating thecredit marketfailure. Aghion and Bolton (1997) develop arelated modeloftheinter-
actionbetween credit market imperfections and development. Intheir paper, production uncertainty
is exogenous, whereas here it is endogenously determined by the crime rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the evidence regarding
the evolution of property crime in nineteenth century Britain. Section 3 lays out the assumptions of
our model and Section 4 characterizes the macroeconomic equilibrium. In Section 5, we character-
ize the development process that arises from the model. We provide conditions under which crime
ratesrisethenfallastheeconomygrows. InSection6, weconsidertheimplicationsofcreditmarket
imperfections for alternative government policies to discourage criminal behavior. The appendix
contains proofs of the main propositions.
2. Property Crime in Nineteenth Century Britain
The evolution of property crime during the British industrial revolution has generated significant
debate amongst crime historians. The seminal works in this area are those of Beattie (1974) and
Gurr(1976),andGatrellandHadden(1972). Jones(1982)summarizestheirconclusionsasfollows:
‘‘... their findings indicate a fairly gentle rise in the eighteenth–century crime rate, with particularly signifi-
cant increases in the early Hanoverian period and a more sudden upward movement in property offenses in the
last three decades. This last rise became spectacular in the years 1815–17, and continued to cause alarm un-
til the critical turning–point of the mid–century .... in the second half of the century, especially after the 1860s,
9 Usher (1989) also emphasizes the distinction between defensive and offensive measures.
5there was a national decline in the number of offences against persons and property until the end of the century,
and beyond ... This picture of major long–term changes in criminal behaviour is complemented by much recent
research in Germany, France, Sweden and other parts of the western world.’’ (Jones 1982, pp. 3–4)
Figure 1 illustrates the number of people per 100,000 of the population of England and Wales
committed to trial for an indictable offence against property (that is an offence tried before a jury in
the superior courts of assize or quarter sessions).10 These are referred to as indictable committals,
and were published from 1805 onwards. Although the returns for some of the early years are miss-
ing, the data exhibit a clear upward trend until the middle of the century followed by a downward
trend in the last half of the century. A similar pattern has been documented in various sub–regions
of Britain (see Jones, 1982, 1992) and in France (see Zehr 1976).11
Reported crime statistics are notoriously difficult to interpret. One reason is that increases in
policing tend to increase the rates of reporting and detection, thereby artificially increasing the
measured crime rate. Also, because crime is an important concern for voters, the authorities may
have an incentive to manipulate the statistics.12 If one takes the reported thefts per 100,000 people
intheU.S.atfacevalue, onewouldfindthatthecrimeratehasrisenexponentiallysincethe1960s.13
However, as one criminologist observes
‘‘...a sober look at the problem shows that there is probably less crime today in the United States than existed
a hundred, or fifty, or even twenty–five years ago, and that today the United States is a more lawful and safe
country than popular opinion imagines.’’ (Bell 1992, p. 53).
The first question that must be asked, therefore, is whether the data in Figure 1 are representative
of the true property crime rate. There were several legal and administrative changes that affected
the coverage and collection of this data, but as discussed in Gatrell and Hadden (1972) most of
these had little affect on the statistics. However, by changing the definition of an indictable offence,
the Criminal Justice Act of 185514 created an artificial drop in the number of indictable committals
between 1855 and 1856. Unfortunately, although summary committals existed before 1855, the
statistics are only available from 1857 onward, and it is not possible to determine what the total
10 The data is from Gatrell and Hadden (1976).
11 The rate of all serious offences exhibits a similar hump–shaped pattern. However, this should not be surprising given that property offences
constituted over 80% of all offences.
12 For example, in the early 1970s, following Nixon’s election pledge to reduce crime, the District of Columbia Police Department systematically
estimated stolen propertyat a value smaller than $50, thereby diminishing the numberofserious larcenies — defined as larceny/theft ofa value larger
than $50 (see Wright 1985).
13 The $50 rule, together with inflation, apparently explains the increase in the number of serious larcenies between 1962 and 1973. The FBI
stopped using this rule in 1973.
14 As a result of this Act, all thefts involving property valued at less than five shillings and all other simple thefts, if the accused pleaded guilty,
were no longer defined as indictable offenses, but rather were brought before a magistrate on summary jurisdiction.













































Figure 1: Property Crime in Nineteenth Century Britain (Source: Gatrell and Hadden, 1972)
7indictable committals would have been had this redefinition not taken place.15 Nevertheless, it can
be seen that the rate of indictable committals still trends downward after 1857, as does the sum of
indictable and total summary committals.16
What factors are responsible for the patterns observed? Like Adam Smith, other contemporaries
had little doubt about the causes of the initial rise in crime:
‘‘Crimes have increased among men because property and transactions connected with property have in-
creased.’’ (Wade, 1833, p. 568)
Several short–term variations can be accounted for by other factors, but did not affect the overall
trend.17 There is, however, a debate amongst historians as to whether the period of declining crime
during the last half of the century was the result of greater efforts to enforce property rights or
improving economic conditions. Although the number of policemen per capita grew in England
and Wales during the latter half of the century,18 there are several reasons to believe that a key
causal factor in the reduction of property crime was the improvement in economic conditions.19
Firstly, increased policing appeared to affect the nature rather than the rate of property crime:
‘‘unless the officers were on the spot at the time robbery, comparatively few criminals were arrested ... It was
largely a case of deciding ... whose area and property to protect and of tracking down suspected persons and
known criminals ... the police determined the place, character and perpetrators of crime.’’ Jones (1982, p.177)
Secondly, Gatrell and Hadden (1972) document that prisoners later in the century were drawn from
a less educated, hardened criminal class which was relatively less numerous, and less representative
of the population as a whole, than was the case earlier in the century. They argue that
‘‘... fewer‘potentiallyhonest’people, whoearlierinthecenturymighthavebeendriventocommitanoffence
because of want, were now brought before the courts.’’
3. Analytical Framework
3.1 Endowments and Preferences
Ineachperiodtaunitpopulationoftwo–periodlivedindividualsisbornintoasmallopeneconomy.
15 This problem did not arise for the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879 (see Gatrell and Hadden, 1972).
16 After 1857, the number of crimes known to the police is also available and exhibits a similar downward trend.
17 For example, part of the large increase between 1814 and 1817 may be attributed the return of young, active males after the Napoleonic war.
18 One implication of this is that the rates of detection, reporting and successful prosecution of crimes would have increased, suggesting that the
fall in the actual crime rate was even more pronounced.
19 AccordingtoGurr(1976,p. 96)increasedpolicingcanonlyreducecriminalbehaviour‘‘whenitreinforcesimprovingsocio–economicconditions’’.
8Thereisnoreproductionsothatindividualsonlycareforthemselves. Eachyoungpersonisendowed
with efficiency units of labor ", drawn from a time–invariant uniform distribution function F(¢),




The young supply their labor to old producers and receive the equilibrium wage, wt, per efficiency
unit of labor supplied. This, in turn, generates a distribution of incomes amongst these agents when
they become old. At t =0 , the initial old generation are assumed to have earned a wage per
efficiency unit of labor, given by w0; where w0 is sufficiently small.20
An agent born at time t has preferences described by the linear utility function:
u(ct;d t+1)=ct + ¯Etdt+1; (2)
where ct and dt+1 represent consumption when young and old, respectively, ¯ is the discount factor
and Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on time t information. Let r>1 be the gross
risk–free interest rate that can be earned on world capital markets. We assume that the rest of the
world has identical preferences, so that r =1 =¯. Since the economy is small relative to the rest
of the world, competition drives the interest rate on deposits to r. These preferences imply that
agents are risk–neutral and that if capital markets were perfect, agents would be indifferent about
the timing of their consumption.
3.2 Production
All members of the old generation have access to a subsistence activity which generates a low
income, y: However, depending on the equilibrium prevailing, they may be able to earn more by
becoming an entrepreneur or a criminal. Those who become entrepreneurs undertake projects that
combine a fixed quantity of capital, k, with variable efficiency units of labor, h, according to a
simple Cobb–Douglas production technology.21 Producers choose efficiency units of labor so as to
maximize short–run profits:
20 We clarify what we mean by ‘sufficiently small’ in Section 4.
21 The assumption of a fixed–size project is not necessary. All that is required is that investments be larger than some minimum scale, so that





® ¡ wth: (3)








and short–run profits µtk,w h e r e







3.3 Crime and Property Rights Enforcement
For reasons described below, a fraction nt of the population become criminals and attempt to steal
the profit of non–criminal producers. We assume that a criminal can attempt to steal from at most
one producer and denote the expected income from doing so by Xt. 22 If a crime fails, the victim
keeps his profits and the criminal gets nothing. If it is successful, there is still a chance that the
criminal will be apprehended and punished.23 We distinguish between the invasion rate, ¼t,—t h e
probability that a crime is attempted against a producer — and the crime rate, nt —t h ef r a c t i o no f
the population engaged in criminal activities.
The ability of criminals to achieve their objectives depends on the effectiveness of both public
institutions (e.g. police force and the courts) and private security measures, in defining and en-
forcing property rights. In our economy, the relevant aspects of the system of property rights are
summarized by four variables:24
² The probability that a crime is successfully deterred in the absence of private security measures,
Á — this variable depends on the effectiveness of public institutions in preventing crime ex ante.
Initially we simplify our exposition by assuming that such institutions are ineffective and setting
Á =0 . In Section 6, we consider the role of public expenditures that increase Á:
²Theexpected disutilityincurredby criminals who arecaughtandpunished,¹k —thisvariablede-
22 The qualitative nature of our results would not change if criminals could attempt more than one invasion. What is crucial however is that each
entrepreneur can only be invaded a small number of times. Normalizing to one significantly simplifies the exposition.
23 We rule out the possibility that borrowers simply voluntarily default on their loan. We assume that the probability of getting away with such
embezzlement is arbitrarily close to zero, since the borrower is easily identified by the lender. In contrast, we assume that output stealing is an
anonymous crime, so that the probability of success is much higher.
24 In general, there are many other dimensions associated with property rights. For example, the right to exclude others from using or consuming
the property or the right to privately sell it.
10pends on the probability that a criminal is successfully apprehended and prosecuted ex post, and on
the disutility of the punishment incurred (e.g. imprisonment).25 Expressing this value as a fraction
of k simplifies the exposition. Since k is fixed, there is no loss of generality.
² The probability that a crime is thwarted by private security measures, ½ — we assume that such
measures are imperfect (½<1) and costly.
² The cost of private security measures — we assume there exists a market for private security
services. The price of protection is pt. The marginal cost of security is °k in the event of an
invasion and is zero otherwise (a convenient normalization). With perfect competition this implies
that private security firms earn zero expected profits:
pt = ¼t°k: (6)
Again, expressing variables as a fraction of k simplifies the exposition.
3.4 The Capital Market
At the beginning of the second period of life, if an individual has accumulated wealth b<k ,h ec a n
borrow (k ¡ b) to undertake a project. If he has accumulated b>k , he can undertake the project
and deposit (b ¡ k) in the bank. He must also choose ex ante whether to invest an additional pt in
private security measures. Although the lender can observe the loan size, he cannot observe ex ante
whether securitymeasuresareactuallyadopted. Onlythosewithsufficientwealthcarried over from
thefirst periodwillfinditintheirinteresttoinvestinprivatesecurity. Sincethereislimitedliability,
the remainder would rather consume the additional funds and face the greater risk of invasion and
default. The lender therefore screens borrowers based on their wealth.26
An entrepreneur will undertake private security measures only if his expected profit when the
required portion of the loan is invested in security measures, exceeds that when it is simply con-
25 Since agents are risk–neutral, there is no need to distinguish between effects of the probability of apprehension and the level of sanction.
26 One way to get around the unobservability of security expenditures is for the banks to provide the security themselves. There are several reasons
why this might not be possible. If security measures are transferable, then the existence of a market for security implies that entrepreneurs, if forced
to buy from the banks, could simply resell to adjust the amount they wish to consume. Even if security measures are non–transferable, the efficient
scale — the compromise between scale economies and agency costs — for firms offering banking services and those providing security services may
not be the same. If banks were to offer security, they would not be able to compete with firms specializing in this particular business. Alternatively,
we could have assumed that entrepreneurs have to provide an unobservable effort to secure their investment. If effort can also be used to generate
income using some other technology, then the moral hazard problem remains and banks have an incentive to screen investors.
11sumed
(1 ¡ ¼t + ½¼t)(µtk ¡ r
s
t[k + pt ¡ b]) > (1 ¡ ¼t)(µtk ¡ r
s
t[k + pt ¡ b]) + rpt; (7)
which can be re-written as
½¼t (µtk ¡ r
s
t[k + pt ¡ b]) >r p t: (8)
The left hand expression represents the gain in expected profit from investing in private security




























such that only those with greater wealth will pay the costs of private security. Note that bc
t is an
increasing function of the probability of invasion.
Although individuals with b ¸ bc
t take private security measures, they are only successful in
thwarting criminals with probability ½<1. If the probability that such an individual is invaded
is ¼t, then the probability that a lender is ultimately repaid by these individuals is (1 ¡ ¼t + ¼t½).






1 ¡ ¼t + ¼t½
; (10)
where the superscript s denotes ‘security’. The net income of borrowing individuals with b ¸ bc
t is
therefore Zs
t + rb,w h e r e
Z
s
t =[ 1¡ ¼t + ¼t½]µtk ¡ r(1 + °¼t)k; (11)
Thoseborrowers forwhom it istoo costly to investin security (b<b c
t) will certainlydefaultwith
probability ¼t. Lenders, understanding this, will charge a greater risk–premium to these borrowers.
The probability that an individual with b<b c












were he to become an entrepreneur, is therefore Zn
t + rb,w h e r e
Z
n
t =( 1¡ ¼t)µtk ¡ rk: (13)
123.5 Occupational Choice and Saving
An agent who earns wt¡1"<b c
t in the first period of his life cannot save enough to qualify for a
low–interest loan. Since he is risk–neutral and ¯ =1 =r, he is indifferent between consuming all of
his income in the first period and saving some of it to invest in his project. We arbitrarily assume





this will make him eligible for a low–interest loan. However, he is indifferent between consuming
the remainder of his income in the first period or saving more than bc
t. Again we assume, without
loss of generality, that he consumes all of his income in excess of bc
t in the first period.















wt¡1" + ¯ max[y;Xt;Zn
t ]; if "<" c
t;
wt¡1" + ¯ max[y;Xt;Zs
t]; if " ¸ "c
t: (15)
The sequence of events for producers and criminals (i.e. individuals in the second period of their
life) is summarized in Figure 2.
4. General Equilibrium
Since the efficiency units of labor supplied by each generation is fixed, it is possible to define a
period t equilibrium, given the wage per efficiency unit received in the previous period, wt¡1.W e
then characterize the alternative equilibria that can arise.









t g such that:
² Entrepreneurs choose the level of labor efficiency units to maximize profits, (4).
² The labor market for the young clears at the equilibrium wage, w?
t.
² Given the invasion rate, ¼?
t, lenders set their loan rates, rn?
t and rs?
t , and the critical level, "c?
t ,t o
maximize expected profits, (9), (10), (12) and (14). Competition drives these expected profits to
13- Borrow, if necessary
-I n v e s tk
- Buy protection
at price pt, if desired
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- Pro¯ts µk are
realized
-W a g e sw are paid
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- Invaded with probability ¼
- If invaded and protected, crime
is successfull with probability 1 ¡ ½
- If invaded and not protected, crime
is always successfull
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- Criminals that were successful
are caught with probability ¹
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Figure 2: A Representative Period for Producers and Criminals
14zero.
² Given their first period incomes, the available interest rates and the invasion rate, agents choose
the occupations that maximize their expected utility, (15).
² Agents’ beliefs about the invasion rate are consistent with the fraction of the population under-
taking criminal activities, i.e. with the crime rate.
4.1 Zero Crime Equilibrium
In a zero crime equilibrium n?
t =0 , so that ¼?
t =0and rn?
t = rs?
t = r. For this to be the case, all
agents must have income above the critical level and, in equilibrium, they must prefer to produce.
In such an equilibrium the market clearing wage must be at its maximum possible level, ¹ w; where






and producers’ short–run profit is at its minimum possible level, µk,w h e r e
µk =( 1¡ ®)AH
®k
1¡®: (17)
The expected net income of all old agents is
Z
? =( µ ¡ r)k: (18)
Theexpected lifetime utilityfromdeviating fromthis equilibrium by stealing iswt¡1"+¯X? where
X
? =( 1¡ ½)[µ ¡ ¹]k: (19)
If the parameters are such that Z? >X ? and µ >r , then a zero crime equilibrium exists, since all
agents prefer to produce and are not constrained from doing so. Note that we assume that X? >y ,
so that crime is always preferred to subsistence for all µt ¸ µ.
4.2 Crime Equilibria
Two distinct types of stable equilibrium featuring positive crime levels are possible:
² Opportunity–Constrained Crime Equilibrium — in such an equilibrium the number of poten-
tial crimes is constrained by the measure of potential victims, so that producers are invaded with
the maximum probability: ¼?
t =1 . A criminal’s expected payoff is X?
t =( 1¡ ½)[µ
?
t ¡ ¹]k,w h e r e
15µ
?
t is given by equation (5) when evaluated at w?
t. If he adopts private security measures, an entre-





tk ¡ r(1 + °)k: (20)
Thefollowingassumptionensuresthatinsuchanequilibriumallagentswhoearnmorethanwt¡1"c?
t
become entrepreneurs rather than criminals:
Assumption A1:
½µt ¡ r(1 + °) > (1 ¡ ½)[µt ¡ ¹]: (21)
Note that so long as this condition holds for µt = µ, it must hold for all µt >µ .27 Poorer agents with
"<" c?
t are better off subsisting than producing because the effective interest rate that they face is
infinite and makes their expected net return from production negative:
Z
n?
t = ¡rk < 0: (22)
It follows that the measure of entrepreneurs is 1¡F("c?
t ). Since criminals attempt to steal from one






The expected payoff to any of the remaining agents with "<" c?
t from becoming a criminal is
zero since there are no remaining victims. Since criminals are exclusively poorer members of the
old generation, with "<" c?
t , it follows that there are (F("c?
t ) ¡ n?
t) individuals with "<" c?
t who
cannot becomecriminals (and thereforesubsist). Foran opportunity–constrainedcrimeequilibrium







² Criminal–Constrained Crime Equilibrium — in this case the number of crimes is determined
by the number of potential criminals. The expected equilibrium payoff to crime is, once again,
X?
t =( 1¡ ½)[µ
?
t ¡ ¹]k. Since the rate of invasion in such an equilibrium is ¼¤
t < 1, the expected




27 Assumption A1 also implies that the zero crime equilibrium exists.
16an equilibrium there are more than enough potential victims amongst the wealthy, so either all less
wealthy agents will become criminals or none will. If all become criminals then n?
t = F("c?


















tk ¡ rk: (25)
Because it must be that X?
t >Z n?

















In both types of crime equilibrium, no agent with first–period income below wt¡1"c?
t ever pro-
duces. In other words, in any crime equilibrium the interest rate faced by low income agents is
always so high that they are effectively shut out of the capital market and either subsist or engage
in criminal activities. As a result, the aggregate demand for labor efficiency units is equal to the
demandfromeachproducer(4), multipliedbythemeasureofagentswith">" c?
t . Thelabormarket










k = H: (27)
Aggregate equilibrium output Y ?
t can then be expressed as a function of the fraction of agents with








Thus, themodel generates astandard aggregate production function in which the level of the capital
stock is determined by the crime rate. In the following analysis we will also be interested in the
resources devoted to enforcing property rights. The fraction of output allocated to private security










5. The Equilibrium Dynamics of Crime and Accumulation
In this section we detail the evolution of an economy which is always in its positive crime equilib-
rium. To save on notation, we drop the superscript ? and assume that all variables take their equilib-
17rium values. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium determination of the crime rate diagrammatically
in ("c
t;¼t) space. The LC curve illustrates the combinations of ¼t and "c
t that are consistent with
both incentive compatibility in the capital market (9) and (14), and labor market equilibrium (27),
























w h e r ew ea l s ou s e d( 5 )a n d( 1 7 )t os u b s t i t u t ef o rµ
?
t and w?
t, thereby introducing µ.T h eP Ic u r v e














An increase in the critical labor efficiency level implies that more agents are denied access to the
capital market. In a criminal–constrained equilibrium, this increases the probability of invasion.
E1 depicts an opportunity–constrained crime equilibrium, with ¼t =1 . E2 depicts a criminal–
constrained crime equilibrium. As they are drawn, the curves intersect only once where ¼t < 1







Lemma 1:There exists an ®0 2 (0;1)suchthatifthewageelasticityoflabor demandis sufficiently
large, ®>® 0, Assumption A2 holds and the crime equilibrium is unique.
To understand Lemma 1, note that with a Cobb–Douglas production function, the slope of the LC
curve increases with the wage–elasticity of labor demand, 1=(1¡®).T os e et h i s ,c o n s i d e rt h ee f f e c t
of a decrease in "c. The associated expansion in the supply of entrepreneurs, 1 ¡ F ("c),r a i s e st h e
demand for labor, drives up the equilibrium wage and reduces the profitability of entrepreneurship.
This can be consistent with the incentive compatibility condition only if the probability of invasion
is lower. The greater is the wage elasticity, the larger is this effect. So long as the wage elasticity of
demand is sufficiently large, the slope of LC exceeds that of PI.
18Note finally that combining equations (26) and (31) for the case of a criminal–constrained equi-
librium generates a minimal invasion rate consistent with this sort of equilibrium, given by
¼t =










µt ¡ r ¡ (1 ¡ ½)[µt ¡ ¹]
2µt ¡ r ¡ (1 ¡ ½)[µt ¡ ¹]
: (34)
If the intersection point in Figure 3 falls below ("c
t;¼t), equilibria with positive crime cease to exist
because it is always better to be a producer.28 In this case, the zero crime equilibrium would be the
unique equilibrium.29
5.1 The Era of Rising Crime
Whentheinitialfirst–periodincomesarelow,agentsmustborrowalargeamountinordertoproduce
and to pay for private security. For a given rate of interest and profit rate, few agents have sufficient
wealth to satisfy the incentive compatibility condition (8) and hence to qualify for a low–interest
loan. The remainder are left with the choice of the subsistence income or a life of crime. However,
the opportunities to gain from crime are limited by the small number of potential victims. Since
there is a surplus of agents who could be criminals, the probability of invasion is driven to its
maximum level and so also is the interest rate. This reinforces the fact that very few agents are
sufficiently wealthy to profitably become entrepreneurs. This opportunity–constrained equilibrium
is illustrated in Figure 3, where the LC curve intersects the PI curve at E1:
In the initial period there is little demand for the labor supplied by the subsequent generation,
so that the wage they receive is correspondingly low. However, provided that w1 >w 0, a greater
fraction of this generation qualifies for a low–interest rate loan than in their parents’ generation,
so that the critical ability level declines, "c
2 <" c
1, and the rate of enterprise, 1 ¡ F("c
t); and hence
aggregate output, both expand. This can be represented in Figure 2 by a leftward shift of the LC
curve: So long as the rate of enterprise remains relatively low (i.e. 1¡F("c
2) < 1=2), the expansion
is not sufficient to draw all agents out of subsistence, and there is a matching increase in the crime
28 Since µ?
t declines over time, so does the minimum invasion rate.
29 Given the parametric assumptions that we have made, a zero crime equilibrium always exists so that, in principle, the economy could jump to
it from the positive crime growth path described below at any date t. However, under certain conditions described below, the economy would then
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Figure 3: Opportunity–Constrained (E1) and Victim–Constrained (E2) Equilibria
20rate, n2 >n 1. However, since the invasion probability is already at its maximum, the level of
insecurity, ¼t; and the lending rate, rs
t; remain unchanged. With decreasing returns to capital at the
aggregate level, the aggregate cost of security grows more rapidly than output, so that the share of
output allocated to private security grows, D2 >D 1. Despite this, the demand for labor rises and
the wages received by the generation born at t =2grow in the first–order stochastic sense.
ThedevelopmentprocesscontinuesinthisfashionsolongastheLCcurveissuchthatopportunity–
constrained equilibria continue to obtain. Increases in the wage allow more agents to undertake
projects and output expands. However, so also do the opportunities to gain from property crime and
the crime rate increases through time. This phase of the development process is thus summarized
by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose w1 >w 0. Then there exists a t? 2 [0;1) such that for all t<t ?
(a) equilibrium wages rise through time, wt >w t¡1,
(b) insecurity remains constant at its maximum rate, ¼t = ¼t¡1 =1 ,
(c) the rate of enterprise rises, "c
t <" c
t¡1,
(d) the crime rate rises, nt >n t¡1,
(e) the lending rate remains at its maximum level, rs
t = r=½,
(f) aggregate output expands, Yt >Y t¡1,
(g) the share of output devoted to private security increase, Dt >D t¡1.
5.2 The Era of Falling Crime
Eventually the economy reaches a date t? in which the inactive subsistence population is exhausted
and increments in the rate of enterprise are no longer matched by increased crime. A criminal–
constrained equilibrium obtains and the next phase of the process begins.
From Proposition 1 we know that wt? >w t?¡1, so that the t¤ +1generation is stochastically
wealthier than the previous one. For a given level of insecurity, ¼t, the critical efficiency level falls
(the LC curve shifts to the left) and there is an increase in the fraction of agents who are eligible
for a low–interest loan. Now, however, the measure of entrepreneurs exceeds the fraction of agents
with first–period income below wt¡1"c
t (i.e. 1 ¡F("c
t) >F("c
t)), so that the equilibrium crime and
























































































































































































































































































































eFigure 4: The Equilibrium Dynamics of Crime and Accumulation
22now be separated into two components: (1) the supply of criminals contracts so that the probability
of invasion falls and the borrowing rate declines, and (2) the demand for labor rises, driving up
the equilibrium wage and reducing profits. The net effect of these two forces determines whether
expected profits and the rate of enterprise rise in equilibrium. From Lemma 1, however, we know
thatsolongasthewageelasticity ofdemandissufficiently large, thesecond forceisrelativelysmall
and the first force dominates. The rate of enterprise thus expands until the effect of the decreased
profit rate, µt; on the fraction of agents who qualify for a loan just offsets the effect of the reduced
borrowing rate (see equation 9).
The increased wage generates a further increase in the rate of enterprise in the next generation
and a further reduction in the crime rate. The economy continues to develop in this fashion as long
as the criminal–constrained equilibrium continues to exist (i.e. as long as the LC curve intersects
thePIcurveabove¼t). Outputexpandswiththerateofenterprise,butthecrimeratedeclinessothat
the resources used to prevent output from being stolen fall. The equilibrium dynamics can therefore
be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2: There exists a t? 2 [0;1) such that if t>t ? then
(a) equilibrium wages continue to rise, wt >w t¡1,
(b) insecurity declines, ¼t <¼ t¡1,
(c) the rate of enterprise continues to rise, "c
t <" c
t¡1,
(d) the crime rate declines, nt <n t¡1 ,
(e) the lending rate falls, rs
t <r s
t¡1,
(f) aggregate output continues to expand, Yt >Y t¡1,
(g) the share of resources devoted to private security declines, Dt <D t¡1 .
Figure 4 illustrates the time paths for the key features of the economy for a parameterized ex-
ample.30 In this example, the economy passes through each phase of the development cycle before
converging to a positive crime rate. Note that, in addition to the direct cost of resources used to
defend property against criminal invasion, the costs of crime also include the loss in output expe-
rienced by each generation relative to the zero–crime economy. It is possible for the economy to
reach a point at which the equilibrium interest rate becomes so low that the returns to production
30 Parameter values are ® =0 :5; H =0 :5; k =1 ;r =1 :05; A =3 ;½ =0 :5; ° =0 :2:
23exceed those from crime for all agents. At this point the economy necessarily jumps to the zero
crime equilibrium.
5.3 The Steady State
Figure 5is usefulfor understanding theconvergenceoftheeconomy toitssteady–stateequilibrium.
The WW–curve depicts the relationship between the critical ability level of the old generation and









The EQ–curve depicts the relationship between the equilibrium critical ability level of the old gen-
eration and the wage they received in the previous period. Each point on this locus represents the









































If they intersect at a value of "c <" c, then the unique equilibrium is a zero crime equilibrium.
However, iftheyintersectat avalueof "c >" c, then thisintersectionrepresentsasteady–statecrime
equilibrium,thatwedenotebythevectorf~ n;~ "c; ~ ¼; ~ w; ~ X; ~ Zn; ~ Zs; ~ rn; ~ rsg. Thefollowingassumption







Proposition 3: There exists an ®1 2 (®0;1) such that if the wage–elasticity of labor demand is
sufficiently large, ®>® 1, then Assumption A3 holds and the economy converges to a unique steady
state crime equilibrium.
24In Lemma 1, a sufficiently high–elasticity of demand, ®>® 0, effectively implied that the EQ–
curve is downward sloping. Here we require a stronger sufficient condition to ensure that it is more
steeply sloped than the WW–curve.
Figure 5 illustrates a situation in which the steady state occurs at a value of "c that is consistent
with a criminal–constrained equilibrium. The path towards this steady state is also illustrated. If
the initial wage w0 is sufficiently small, the economy passes through the opportunity–constrained
region, before entering the criminal–constrained region and converging to the steady state. How-
ever, it is also possible that the point of intersection occurs in the opportunity–constrained region, in
which case the economy would converge to an opportunity–constrained steady–state. The type of
steady state to which the economy converges depends on whether the WW curve and the EQ curve











1¡® > (1 + 2°)k; (40)
then the economy converges to a criminal–constrained steady–state. Otherwise, the economy con-
verges to an opportunity–constrained steady–state.
The economy will not reach the second phase if the cost of security is high or if the effectiveness of
private security is low. However, high productivity and a productive labor force are factors which
willtendtoovercometheseconstraintsand allowtheeconomytoreach thephaseofdeclining crime
rates.
If the point of intersection occurs at a value of "c that is inconsistent with a positive crime equi-
librium, the unique steady–state is one with zero crime. Note that if the EQ curve intersects the
"c = "c boundary at a wage below w then, once a zero crime equilibrium occurs, the economy can
never revert back to a positive crime equilibrium because the wealth of subsequent generations is
sufficiently high to rule out such equilibria.
If Assumption A3 does not hold, then it is possible that the EQ and WW curves intersect more
than once, so that there would be multiple steady–state equilibria. Such a situation is illustrated in
Figure 6, where S1, S2 and S3 represent three steady state equilibria. Only S1 and S3 are stable
however, and to which of these the economy converges depends on the initial wage. If w0 > ^ w,
25EQ
WW
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Figure 5: Convergence to a Steady–State Equilibrium
26the economy converges to a steady state featuring low crime and high productivity (S1), whereas if
w0 < ^ w; the economy converges to a high–crime steady state (S3). One implication of this case is
that a sufficiently large injection of wealth could shift the economy from a high–crime steady–state
to a low–crime one.
6. Public Expenditures to Deter Crime
Thus far we have taken as given the effectiveness of public sector institutions used to deter crime,
apprehend criminals and impose punishments. In this section, we allow for the possibility that in-
creasedpublicspendingmayenhancetheeffectivenessoftheseinstitutions. Wedistinguishbetween
two categories of public policy: (1) punishment — public expenditures that raise the expected cost
of being apprehended and/or punished, and (2) prevention — public expenditures that reduce the ex
ante probability that a crime is successful in the first place. When occupational choices are partly
determined by credit constraints, public spending can have quite different consequences depending
on whether it enhances the effectiveness of punishment or prevention. Throughout most of this
section we simplify the exposition by focusing on a steady state criminal–constrained equilibrium.
6.1 Punishment
Previous related analyses such as those of Becker (1968) and Sah (1991) have emphasized the role
of punishment in affecting equilibrium outcomes. In their models, harsher punishments or a greater
likelihood of prosecution reduces the payoff to criminal activity, thereby inducing more people
to undertake legal activities. However, in the presence of sufficiently severe credit constraints,
increasing the expected cost ofpunishment may havelittle impact. Thereason is that individuals do
notchoosetobecomecriminalsbecausethepayoffishigherthanproduction,butratherbecausethey
are constrained from becoming entrepreneurs by their lack of wealth. Such public investment will
onlyhaveanyeffectontheequilibriumoutcomeiftheexpectedpunishmentissolargethatitreduces
the expected payoff of a criminal, ~ X, below that of an entrepreneur who does not invest in private
security, ~ Zn. Ifitrequiressignificantincreasesintaxes, thenraisingtheexpectedcostofpunishment
may even have a detrimental effect, actually raising crime rates and lowering productivity.
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Figure 6: Multiple Steady–State Equilibria
28tional tax ¿ on the wages of the young, so that total expenditure at time tis given by
Tt = ¿ ~ wH = ¿®~ Y: (41)
This imposition of such a tax reduces the after–tax wealth of agents when they are old and hence
effectively reduces the fraction that are able to qualify for a low interest loan.31 We follow the














ing and punishment (e.g. the costs of more time in prison), the greater the expected cost perceived
by criminals.32
Given the steady state equilibrium values, increased investment in punishment raises ¹ and
thereby shifts the boundary"c = "c in Figure 5 to the right (see (34)). Ceteris paribus, a sufficiently
large increase in ¹ might therefore eventually push the economy into the zero crime equilibrium.
Unfortunately, there are two factors offsetting this effect. Firstly, distortion created by the increased
taxes required to finance this expenditure cause the EQ–curve to shift to the right, reflecting the
fact that the after–tax wealth of the young generation is reduced. This causes the steady–state equi-
librium crime rate to rise and entrepreneurial productivity to decline. Secondly, as the steady–state
crime rate, F(~ "c), expands and the tax base, ®~ Y;contracts, expenditure per criminal declines, off-
settingtheeffecton¹oftheincreasein¿. Itfollowsthatexpenditureswhichincreasetheprobability
of conviction and/or the size of sanctions could have detrimental long–run consequences, actually
raising the crime rate and lowering per capita income.33
6.2 Prevention
In contrast, public spending which enhances the effectiveness of ex ante prevention of successful
criminal activity (e.g. police patrols, public security, gun control laws) can have large effects on the
margin. By reducing the probability that crimes will initially be successful, prevention reduces the
31 In this sense it does not matter whether the tax is proportional or lump sum. Note further that the follow arguments would go through if we were
to consider a tax on entrepreneurial profits - the borrowing constraint would become more binding.
32 The exact relationship between ¹ and spending per criminal is not important for the following argument.
33 Allowing for a distribution of disutilities associated with criminal acts (e.g. varying moral values), say, might imply that increased punishment
would have some impact on the margin. Nevertheless, the presence of credit constraints will still tend to weaken the effect of punishments.
29ex ante cost of private security measures and reduces the interest rate faced by borrowers. This, in
turn, reduces the critical wealth level required to qualify for a loan, induces greater legal activity
and reduces the crime rate.
If public crime prevention reduces the success probability of a criminal to 1¡Á, then the proba-
bilityofinvasionintheabsenceofprivatesecuritymeasuresis(1¡Á)¼t. Supposethatexpenditures
onpreventionareagainfinancedbytaxesonwageincome(41),andthattheprobabilityÁisassumed












This particular formulation is simple because Á depends only on the tax rate, and not on any en-
dogenous variables. Moreover it seems reasonable to assume that the greater is the property that is
protected by the public sector, the larger the cost of doing so.34 We assume that private and public
security measures are complementary, so that the competitive price of private security measures is























The WW–curve and ¼("c) are still given by (35) and (37), respectively.
As described earlier, the increase in ¿ causes the EQ–curve to shift to the right, so that the
equilibrium crime rate increases. However, the resulting increase in Á causes the EQ–curve to shift
to the left, reflecting the fact that for any give rate of enterprise the degree of insecurity is reduced.
Thus, the net equilibrium impact of an increase in public investment in crime prevention depends
on whether the increase in Á is sufficiently large to outweigh the associated increase in ¿ and cause
the EQ–curve to shift down and to the left. This will be the case if dÁ=d¿ is large enough. If it
is, then the steady–state crime rate declines and the long–run level of productivity rises. Thus we
have:
Proposition 5: Suppose the economy initially rests in a criminal–constrained steady–state equilib-
rium. Then there exists a ±>0 such that if the responsiveness of prevention to an increase in the
34 Again the arguments here do not depend on the exact formulation.
30tax rate is sufficiently large, dÁ=d¿ > ± , then greater prevention increases the steady–state rate of
enterprise, 1¡F(~ "c), aggregate output, ~ Y , and the wage, ~ w, and reduces the invasion rate, ~ ¼; and
the crime rate, ~ n.
If instead the economy was initially in an opportunity–constrained steady state, then even if
dÁ=d¿ is large enough to ensure that the rate of enterprise expands with ¿,t h ec r i m er a t ew i l lr i s e .
This is because the borrowing rate remains high and severely constrains the fraction of agents that
canbecomeentrepreneurs. Nevertheless,steady–stateoutputandwagelevelswouldcontinuetorise
despite the increased crime rate. Financing a decrease in Á with an increase in ¿ also has interesting
implications for the transitional dynamics. Again suppose that dÁ=d¿ is large enough to ensure
that the rate of enterprise expands. Then, starting from an opportunity–constrained equilibrium,
this change in the institutions will induce an increase in the crime rate because of the rise in the
number of opportunities. But this increase in crime is not inherently bad; it means that the economy
will experience the phase of declining crime rates earlier. Put another way, considering a graph
representing the evolution of crime through time one would observe an increase in the slope of the
rising part of the curve, and a shift to the left of its peak — the economy would get over the hump
more rapidly.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have developed a dynamic general equilibrium model linking the process of economic devel-
opment to the interaction between property crime and credit market imperfections. We used it to
illustrate how and why an economy will tend to go through a phase of rising crime followed by a
phase of falling crime as it develops. Theinitial phase corresponds to Adam Smith’s hypothesis that
property crime would tend to rise with the accumulation of wealth, and arises when credit market
constraints are particularly severe. The later phase is consistent the models of Baumol (1990) and
Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1993) in which economies with lower crime rates tend to be more
highly developed. The overall pattern is consistent with the empirical evidence on the evolution of
property crime in during the process of industrialization. We characterized the convergence of the
economy to its long–run steady–state equilibrium and detailed the factors determining the nature of
this equilibrium.
31The model also allowed us to illustrate the implications of the interaction between crime and
credit constraints for alternative crime–deterring public policies. In a world with no credit con-
straints, greater investment in institutions which raise the cost and likelihood of apprehension and
prosecution have significant equilibrium effects on crime and productivity. However, in the pres-
ence of credit market imperfections such policies are likely to be ineffective at best and, if they
are costly, may even be detrimental. In such cases, policies that enhance the effectiveness of crime
prevention are likely to be a more cost–effective method for reducing crime and increasing long run
productivity.
Various extensions of our work are possible. For example, there is no engine for sustained long–
run per capita income growth in our model. One way to introduce such an engine would be to
allow the aggregate efficiency units of labor (i.e. human capital) or total factor productivity to
grow endogenously over time. If the costs of security were to remain constant, then eventually
they would become negligible relative to wealth, and the economy would always attain a zero–
crime equilibrium in the long run. However, there are reasons to suspect that the cost of private
security might also grow over time, as criminals become more sophisticated and gain access to
better technologies for pursuing their objectives. In this case, the economy may converge to a
long–run growth path with positive crime rates.
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2H[1 ¡ Ft]2: (A3)








PI, then Assumption A2 can be expressed as
j¦j =
rwt¡12H[1 ¡ Ft]2 +[ 1¡ (1 ¡ ½)¼t]®[1 ¡ Ft]1¡®µk ¡ B("c
t)
2HB("c
t)[1 ¡ Ft]2 > 0: (A4)
Since the denominator is positive, it follows that j¦j > 0 if
rwt¡1"[1 ¡ Ft]
2 +[ 1¡ (1 ¡ ½)¼t]®[1 ¡ Ft]
1¡®µk ¡ B("
c
t) > 0: (A5)
In a criminal–constrained equilibrium, we know that Ft < 1





























































As ® ! 1; the first term in brackets becomes arbitrarily large. Thus, there must exist some ®0 2
(0;1) such that j¦j > 0 for all ®>® 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider any time period t<t ? such that the equilibrium which obtains
is an opportunity–constrained equilibrium and wt¡1 >w t¡2.S i n c e¼ =1 , the impact of a wage
35increase on "c







rwt¡1 + ®½(1 ¡ Ft)(¡®¡1)µ 1
2H
< 0: (A9)
Thus, thecritical efficiency level declines: "c
t <" c
t¡1. Since, in an opportunity–constrained equilib-
rium, nt =1¡ F("c
t), it follows that nt >n t¡1, and from (28), Yt >Y t¡1.F r o m( 2 9 )Dt >D t¡1;








It follows that wt >w t¡1: Since, by assumption w1 >w 0, Proposition 1 follows by induction.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let t? +1be the first time period in which a criminal–constrained equi-
librium obtains. From Proposition 1, we know that wt? >w t?¡1. In such an equilibrium ¼t and "c
t


















Let ¦denote the Jacobian matrix on the left–hand side of (A11). Lemma 1 implies that j¦j > 0,s o



























It follows that ¼t?+1 <¼ t? and "c
t?+1 <" c
t?. The crime rate is now given by nt = F("c
t),a n ds o
nt?+1 <n t?: Since ¼t?+1 <¼ t?, (10) implies that rR
t?+1 <r R
t?.S i n c e"c
t?+1 <" c
t?, (28) implies that

















Since this is increasing in "c
t, it follows that Dt?+1 <D t?: Finally, from (27), it must be the case that
wt?+1 >w t?.S i n c ewt? >w t?¡1, Proposition 2 follows by induction.









































Since in a criminal–constrained equilibrium, "c
2H < 1
2 and F("c) < 1

















>® r : (A17)
As ® ! 1, the left–hand side becomes arbitrarily large. Hence there must exist an ®12 (0;1) such
that the condition holds for all ®>® 1.















































Proof of Proposition 5: A steady–state crime equilibrium is a vector (~ ¼; ~ w;~ "c) s o l v i n g( 3 5 ) ,( 4 3 )





























r(1 ¡ ¿)~ w
(1 ¡ Á) ~ B
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rk ¡ r(1 ¡ ¿)~ w~ "c
i
2(1 ¡ Á)H ~ B2 < 0; (A22)
37J12 = ¡
r(1 ¡ ¿)~ "c







1¡® < 0; (A24)
J22 = ¡



























r ~ w~ "c
(1 ¡ Á) ~ B
< 0; (A27)
~ B =( 1 ¡ ½)
·















0; if ~ "c >H ;
1=2H(1 ¡ ~ F)2 if ~ "c <H :
(A29)
Let J denote the 3 £ 3 matrix on the left hand-side of (A21). Assumption A3 implies that jJj < 0.





































where for the invasion rate ~ ¼, the weak inequality is replaced by an equality for an opportunity–
constrained equilibrium, and by a strict inequality for a criminal–constrained equilibrium. The












c; ~ w;~ ¼: (A33)
Using equations (A30), (A31), and (A32), it can be seen that ~ "c decreases, ~ w increases, and ~ ¼ does







That is, if dÁ=d¿ is sufficiently large and positive. Since a decrease in ~ "c increases steady–state
aggregate output, ~ Y and reduces the crime rate, ~ n, Proposition 5 follows.
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